Evolutionary Instincts: Not Quite What You Think

Lord Daniel Finkelstein, former board member of the Gatestone Institute which published such hits about how Islamification is leading to White Extinction, has been having some thoughts about racism. To sum up: Conservatives are uniquely able to understand real racism and its real causes, because they are aware that it is a natural behaviour and part of the human condition. We must therefore be cautious about claims that it can be eliminated by destroying capitalism, or changing education patterns, and instead wearily recognise that we must work hard at overcoming it whilst also preventing the swarthy heathen from taking our women.

So basically the standard conservative thought about racism since at least the 1960s.

Anyway, as part of this Finkelstein refers to the 'evolutionary instinct that leads us to co-operate with people who are like us and to reject and even fight those who seem unfamiliar'. Now Finkelstein doesn't provide a basis for this claim (and I'm not paying the Times money to find out), but I can guess where it comes from, as it's a canard that regularly does the rounds.

This likely harks back to a man called William Hamilton, who came up (as a joke as I recall) with the notion of 'inclusive fitness' [1]. How this works is as follows:

I and my brother share 50% of our genes - therefore I'm more likely to be altruistic towards him, as there's a greater chance of my genes being passed on if I help him; conversely I only share 25% of my genes with a cousin, so I'm less likely to be altruistic towards them, but more so then I would a stranger.

And so on. The basic concept is that the more I'm related to someone the more likely I am to be altruistic to them, because supposedly there's a higher likelihood that we share genes. This then morphs into the argument that, e.g. racism is 'natural', because it's a form of gene sorting - I'm more likely to share genes with people of a similar 'race' (or ethnicity, or culture) than I am with others, so I will be more co-operative towards them, and less co-operative towards others.

That, I believe, is the likely foundation that's being deployed in what Finkelstein says that we have an evolutionary instinct towards helping people who are 'like us' and fighting those who are 'unfamiliar'.

There is, however, a large flaw with this: it doesn't make much evolutionary sense. There's no guarantee that someone who looks like me, or shares the same cultural markers as me, with share the same genes as me - equally someone who look doesn’t like me might have the same genes as me. In short, as a rule, it's not very efficient as is open to being cheated on by others who don't have that 'instinct'.

Contrarily, a far better rule (as Queller, 1985 has noted) for determining whether someone shares the same genes as me would be for this to be based around values or behaviours. I.e. if someone behaves altruistically, they probably have the same genes that make me behave altruistically, so co-operating with them passes on my genes. This eliminates the problem. And note that there's no limit to this - the people who behave like me is a potentially infinite set, and a larger one than 'people who look like me'.

Now of course racism works on the logic of convincing people that 'someone who looks like me' is more trustworthy than someone who is unfamiliar; hence the capitalist captain of industry is 'on my side' whereas the brown-skinned man is trying to take my job, and consequently never ask why there isn't adequate supports in place in the first instance. This is hardly a novel insight, but what it does show is that, whether there is an evolutionary instinct or not, it is in the terrain of culture not nature.

I'm sure the Lord Finkelstein has given this deep consideration; but for my part, I can't help but wonder if a political and economic system that, by its nature (pun intended), pitches people into competition and divides them is really the best way of solving this issue.

[1] This assumes that the gene is the unit of selection (that is the site evolution operates on), rather than the individual, or the group (or all of the above). The jury is still out on which one it is, but biologists and philosophers of biology are moving towards 'all of the above' as the correct answer. Here I’ll be taking the gene-eye view, as that’s easier to explain and I assume it’s one the Finkelstein, and Leslie are using.

Reference

Queller, D. C. (1985) 'Kinship, reciprocity and synergism in the evolution of social behaviour', Nature Vol. 318, pp. 366-367.